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From Mayberry to Ferguson: The
Militarization of American Policing
Equipment, Culture, and Mission
Cadman Robb Kiker III*
Abstract
We are at the dawn of a new era of policing in the United
States. In recent months, images of armed police officers
patrolling the streets of Ferguson, Missouri, and of a toddler
burned by a Georgia SWAT team’s grenade have been indelibly
branded into America’s social consciousness. There is a unique
bipartisan outcry from Washington in a time otherwise marked by
bitter political divides. Politicians and journalists alike are
questioning the efficacy of a militaristic police force and the path
that led to this shift in the paradigm of policing.
This Essay examines the how and why of police militarization
in the United States; it details some of the most egregious
instances of police overreach, mission creep, and proliferation of
military-style police units treating citizens as an enemy
population. It seems all is quiet in Congress after a few seemingly
futile hearings on militarization. The Executive Branch has
released suggestions that are expected to manifest in an executive
order any day. Unfortunately, all of these solutions are too little,
too late. The streets of America are much more akin to a war zone
than the democratic nation that our Founders envisioned, and it is
up to the people, at a local level, to reclaim what was intended.

* Law Library Fellow, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
J.D., Washington and Lee University, 2014. Special thanks to Margaret Hu,
Erik Luna, and Andrew Christensen for their invaluable input and Brandon
Callahan, American University, for his research assistance.
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“The means of defence against foreign danger, have been
always the instruments of tyranny at home.”—James Madison1
I. Introduction
Over the last several decades, there has been a paradigm
shift within police departments across the United States.2 Public
1. James Madison, Speech from the Constitutional Convention June 29,
1787, in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 465 (Max
Farrand, ed. 1911).
2. See WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN
POLICING,
AM.
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
UNION
(2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-webrel1.pdf [hereinafter ACLU Report] (detailing the use of paramilitary police
units, the sources of the equipment used by such units, the effect that
militarization has on policing generally, and the disparate effect of modern
policing units on various communities—most notably minority communities);
Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2003) (discussing the details of the
decay of the protections afforded by the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1385 (2012), upon the advent of the global war on terrorism); Diane Cecilia
Weber, Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of Paramiltiarism in American
Police Departments (Cato Inst., Briefing Papers No. 50, 1999),
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/bp50.pdf (providing a history of
the rise of paramilitarism in the United States up to 1999, beginning in the
1960s); Hank Johnson & Michael Shank, Why Do Police Departments Need
Military Vehicles and Weapons?, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2014, 5:07 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/03/10/america-police-militaryweapons-column/5789445/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (detailing the acquisition
of military vehicles and weapons by multiple American towns and some of the
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concern about the militarized form of local policing has become
much more vocal following an unfortunate incident in August
2014, in which a Caucasian police officer shot and killed an
unarmed African-American teen in Ferguson, Missouri.3 The
public’s response was initially concerned with racial issues,
prompting protests and some instances of looting and violence.
Local law enforcement responded by sending in police that were
virtually indistinguishable from soldiers, equipped with military
weapons, equipment, body armor, and armored vehicles to
disperse the demonstrators.4 These events prompted many to ask
how the shift to a militarized police force could go largely
unnoticed until now. More importantly, now that the militarized
police force is a reality, what can we do about it? Does it violate
our Constitution or our federal laws?
This Essay presents answers to both of these questions.
First, this Essay presents a short explanation of the sources of
this militarization. Next, it explores the relevant legal
prohibitions on military policing and our longstanding policy
against military involvement in civilian legal affairs. It continues
by examining the government’s response to the public outcry in
Ferguson. Finally, this Essay will assess potential responses to
the militarization of the police force, concluding what can and
should be done to address this policy concern. It is important to
note that this Essay does not advocate on behalf of a specific
political ideology or agenda, but rather attempts to lay bare an

programs that law enforcement agencies use to acquire them) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, What We Know About Michael Brown’s
Shooting,
CNN
(Aug.
15,
2014,
12:10
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/us/missouri-ferguson-michael-brown-what-weknow/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
4. See Paul Szoldra, This Is the Terrifying Result of the Militarization of
Police,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Aug.
12,
2014,
4:05
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/police-militarization-ferguson-2014-8
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2015) (quoting a soldier from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne
Division who referred to the Ferguson, Missouri police response to protestors by
stating that “[w]e rolled lighter than that in an actual warzone”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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important issue, analyze the contextual underpinnings, and
present a prudent path forward.

II. The Militarization of Police: Sources and Mission Creep
The concept of the “warrior cop”5 we see patrolling the streets
of America today has been created as a response to the various
“wars” propagated by numerous politicians. There have been
“wars” on crime, drugs, and, since the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, terrorism.6 The slide towards militarization
began in the 1960s with the war on crime, during which police
departments around the country created paramilitary-style police
units. Former Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates envisioned
the first of these tactical units as a response to the futility of
traditional police tactics—such as having officers present as a
deterrent—during the 1966 Watts riots.7 Gates created the first
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)8 team to react to high-risk
situations, employing military-style guerrilla warfare and
counter-sniper tactics he sourced from a nearby U.S. Marine

5. This term has been attributed to Radley Balko. See generally RADLEY
BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP (2013).
6. See Karl Bickel, Will the Growing Militarization of Our Police Doom
Community Policing?, COMMUNITY POLICING DISPATCH, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec.
2013), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/12-2013/will_the_growing_militarizati
on_of_our_police_doom_community_policing.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2015)
(stating that a combination of academies modeled after military boot camp,
military style uniforms, an “us versus them” mentality, and the war on crime,
war on drugs, and war on terrorism threaten community policing) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. Karan R. Singh, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military SpecialOperations Trained Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 673, 675 (2001) (citing DARYL GATES, CHIEF: MY LIFE IN THE L.A.P.D.
110 (1992); ROBERT L. SNOW, SWAT TEAMS 6–7 (1996)).
8. The term “SWAT” will be used henceforth to refer to all special units or
tactical teams within a law enforcement agency that are used for high-risk or
critical situations. These teams are referred to by a number of acronyms such as
HRT (Hostage Response Team), SERT (Special Emergency Response Team),
SRT (Special Reaction Team), SOG (Special Operations Group), and ESU
(Emergency Services Unit). Many of these acronyms are department specific.
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Corps unit.9 Gates deployed his SWAT team for the first time
against the Los Angeles headquarters of the Black Panthers.10
The botched raid resulted in the use of over five thousand rounds
of ammunition and Gates asking Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty
to request permission from the Department of Defense (DOD) to
fire a grenade into the headquarters.11 Radley Balko notes that,
in retrospect, it was not the use of a grenade launcher that was
remarkable, but “the procedures, the caution, and the trepidation
that went into procuring the grenade launcher. About twenty
years later, the Pentagon would begin giving away . . . plenty of
grenade launchers.”12 Today, at least two university police
departments have procured grenade launchers from the federal
government.13 The grenade launchers have never been used and
the campus police departments only have access to gas canister
ammunition.14 The troubling issue, however, is the lack of
oversight and discretion on behalf of the federal government that
allowed a campus police department to obtain a weapon of war.
The number of specialty police units—and the frequency of
their use—expanded in the 1980s to meet the needs of the war on
drugs.15 Today, seventy-nine percent of SWAT team deployments
9. See Singh, supra note 7, at 676 (citing DARYL GATES, CHIEF: MY LIFE IN
THE L.A.P.D. 109 (1992)).

10. See id. at 678.
11. John Payne, How Police Became a Standing Army, AM. CONSERVATIVE
(Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-policebecame-a-standing-army/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (reviewing Radley Balko’s
book, Rise of the Warrior Cop) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
12. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting BALKO, supra note 5, at
79–80).
13. Tyler Kingkade & Alexandra Svokos, Campus Police Are Stocking up on
Military-Grade Weapons, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2014, 5:47 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/15/campus-policeweapons_n_5823310.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2014, 4:59 PM) (last visited
Feb. 16, 2015) (explaining what kinds of weapons are in the possession of
universities and colleges and noting that sixty-three college campuses have
acquired M-16s, twenty-seven have received M-14s, and six have procured mineresistant vehicles from the Department of Defense) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
14. Id.
15. See Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American
Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1, 7
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are for the execution of a warrant, most commonly in drug
investigations.16 The expense of the weapons and gear used by
such units made them cost prohibitive in small communities until
the advent of the federal 1033 Program.17 This program, operated
by the DOD, allows for surplus military weaponry and gear to be
transferred to local law enforcement agencies.18 Although the
equipment supplied by the 1033 Program is free, many small law
enforcement agencies could not justify the related maintenance
expenses to their respective tax bases at the time the program
was introduced.
This changed after 9/11. Suddenly, the federal government
tasked every law enforcement agency in the United States—no
matter the size—with being a part of the “global war on
terrorism.”19 This new federal mandate also resulted in a massive
reorganization of several federal agencies, many of them falling
under the control of the newly formed Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).20 The DHS has become a powerhouse agency
with a 2013 expenditure of over sixty billion dollars.21 Some of
(1997) (explaining that paramilitary police units (PPUs) expanded to being used
for “high risk warrant work,” which is almost entirely drug raids).
16. ACLU Report, supra note 2, at 5 (“SWAT teams were often deployed—
unnecessarily and aggressively—to execute search warrants in low-level drug
investigations; deployments for hostage or barricade scenarios occurred in only a
small number of incidents.”).
17. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. 104201, 110 Stat. 2422 (1996). This Act was an update to the 1208 Program, which
was included in the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act. See National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1485
(1990).
18. See About the 1033 Program, L. ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT OFFICE, DEF.
LOGISTICS AGENCY, http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Pages/default.asp
x (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (describing how the 1033 Program operates) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days, U.S. DEP’T
STATE, http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm (last updated Jan. 20,
2009) (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (discussing the U.S. reaction to 9/11 and
associated changes in law enforcement) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
20. See Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, DEP’T HOMELAND
SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last updated
Oct. 21, 2014) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
21. BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2014, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.,
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this immense budget is available to local law enforcement
agencies in the form of grants that can be used to acquire
military equipment from the federal government.22 As of 2007,
approximately eighty percent of U.S. towns with a population
between twenty-five thousand and fifty thousand people
maintained a SWAT team.23 More current numbers of nationwide
SWAT deployments are generally unavailable due to a lack of
oversight. However, a Maryland law requiring police departments
to track SWAT deployments released a report showing that
Maryland alone deployed a SWAT team an average of four-andone-half times per day in 2014 and that over ninety-three percent
of those deployments were for the execution of a search warrant.24
Nearly sixty percent of those deployments were for nonviolent
crimes.25
As an additional incentive for repeated deployment, SWAT
team use can be self-funding. As Peter B. Kraska and Victor E.
Kappeler found in a 1996 survey, the execution of warrants on
private residences has become a proactive policing tool in which
officers are often just as concerned with seizing money and
weapons as they are drugs for the purpose of funding new
military-style equipment.26 When performing these drug raids,
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MGMT/FY%202014%20BIB%
20-%20FINAL%20-508%20Formatted%20%284%29.pdf.
22. See Find and Apply for Grants, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/how-do-i/find-and-apply-grants (last updated Oct. 29, 2012)
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (describing how law enforcement may apply for such
equipment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Funding for
Equipment, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/funding/Pages/equipmentfunding.aspx (last updated Sept. 7, 2013) (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (listing new
and surplus equipment funding programs for law enforcement, including the
1033, 1122, and DHS programs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
23. Peter B. Kraska, Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st
Century
Police,
1
POLICING
501,
507
(2007),
http://cjmasters.eku.edu/sites/cjmasters.eku.edu/files/21stmilitarization.pdf.
24. See MD. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF CRIME
CONTROL & PREVENTION, FIFTH REPORT TO THE STATE OF MARYLAND UNDER
PUBLIC SAFETY ARTICLE § 3-507, FISCAL YEAR 2014 SWAT TEAM DEPLOYMENT
DATA
ANALYSIS
3,
6
(2014),
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/msac/documents/SWATReportFY2014.pdf.
25. Id. at 6.
26. See Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that money and
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officers often request “no-knock” warrants, claiming that law
enforcement interests merit the lightning-fast display of
overwhelming force.27 However, even if the officers are unable to
obtain a no-knock warrant, the consequences of proceeding with a
no-knock raid anyway are nearly non-existent since the Supreme
Court ruled in 2006 that such a raid does not trigger the
exclusionary rule.28 The aforementioned ACLU report indicates
that, of the law enforcement agencies that it surveyed, SWAT
teams were deployed for active-shooter or hostage situations only
seven percent of the time.29
The use of SWAT has become so prolific that it seems at
times to border on the absurd. The Eleventh Circuit recently
ruled in Berry v. Leslie30 that police officers using SWAT tactics to
perform a regulatory raid on Orlando, Florida barbershops
violated the Fourth Amendment.31 In 2009, the Fifth Circuit
allowed a civil rights claim to continue against Louisiana police
for a SWAT raid of a nightclub that the officials couched as a
regulatory inspection.32 In St. Louis County, Missouri—home to
Ferguson—police have announced that it is their standard
procedure to use a SWAT team to serve any felony warrant.33
asset seizure through “warrantwork” has become a “proactive policing tactic,
perhaps more prevalent than undercover work, of PPUs conducting militarystyle investigatory drug raids on private residences”).
27. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929–37 (1995) (finding that the
common law knock-and-announce rule is part of the reasonableness analysis of
the Fourth Amendment and various factors may justify an unannounced entry).
28. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–99 (2006) (noting that
increasing professionalism of police forces and civil rights suits were enough of a
police deterrent to knock-and-announce violations and finding that the
exclusionary rule was not warranted in knock-and-announce violations). The
exclusionary rule originated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and
was applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). The Court rejected its “indiscriminate application” in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984).
29. See ACLU Report, supra note 2, at 5.
30. 767 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir.), order vacated pending rehearing en banc,
Berry v. Orange County, 771 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2014).
31. See id. at 1154.
32. Club Retro v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 195 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that
defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity for their entry and search of
Club Retro).
33. George Sells, Warrant Served by SWAT Team Causes Scare in South
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Finally, in perhaps the most egregious example of SWAT mission
creep in recent memory, an Arkansas police chief announced a
policy in 2012 that called for SWAT officers to patrol the streets
of an exceptionally small town, stopping every pedestrian who
crossed their path and demanding identification and a reason for
being out walking.34 According to the chief, those who were
unable or refused to produce identification would likely be
charged with obstructing a government operation.35 All of these
situations violate the intended role of police in society. As John
Paul and Michael Birzer note in their essay on the social
relations between police and the public, “[t]he job of the police is
to react to the violence of others, to apprehend criminal suspects
and deliver them over to a court of law[,]” not to “initiate[]
violence on command [without concern for] the Bill of Rights.”36 It
is abundantly clear that this mindset does not pervade modern
policing in the United States.37
Some of these raids have had tragic consequences. In Detroit,
a seven-year-old girl was shot in the head and killed after a
SWAT team entered her home.38 The suspect that the team
County,
FOX2NOW
ST.
LOUIS
(Aug.
13,
2013,
9:36
PM),
http://fox2now.com/2013/08/13/warrant-served-causes-scare-in-south-countyneighborhood/ (last updated Aug. 14, 2013, 9:31 AM) (last visited Feb. 11, 2015)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. Radley Balko, The Police State Comes to Arkansas, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 18, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/radley-balko/the-policestate-comes-to_b_2321878.html (last updated Feb. 17, 2013, 5:12 AM) (last
visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. See id.
36. John Paul & Michael L. Birzer, Images of Power: An Analysis of the
Militarization of Police Uniforms and Messages of Service, 32 FREE INQUIRY IN
CREATIVE SOC. 121, 124 (2004) (quoting Weber, supra note 2, at 10).
37. See, e.g., Sunil Dutta, I’m a Cop. If You Don’t Want to Get Hurt, Don’t
Challenge
Me,
WASH
POST
(Aug.
19,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/19/im-a-cop-if-youdont-want-to-get-hurt-dont-challenge-me/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (“[I]f you
don’t want to get shot, tased, pepper-sprayed, struck with a baton or thrown to
the ground, just do what I tell you.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
38. Kate Abbey-Lambertz, How a Police Officer Shot a Sleeping 7-Year-Old
to
Death,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
17,
2014,
5:39
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/aiyana-stanley-jones-joseph-weekleytrial_n_5824684.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2014, 2:59 PM) (last visited Feb. 16,
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sought lived in the other unit of the girl’s family’s duplex, and a
man detained on the street before the raid warned the officers
that there were children in the home.39 In Cornelia, Georgia, a
SWAT team executed a no-knock warrant on a suspected drug
dealer and, before entering the home, threw a “flash bang”
grenade that landed in the crib of a small child, severely burning
the child’s face.40 Since the incident, a grand jury has cleared the
raiding officers of any wrongdoing and the county has rescinded
an initial offer to pay for the child’s medical expenses.41 But it is
not always the residents of a raided home that are the victims of
these aggressive tactics. Although police departments often cite
“officer safety” to justify the tactics used in these raids, the SWAT
officers themselves have been the victims of violence when an
unsuspecting homeowner mistook a no-knock raid for a home
invasion and opened fire in perceived self-defense.42 In one case
in Texas, a grand jury refused to indict a man who killed a police
officer under the belief that the officer was a criminal breaking
into his home.43
III. Existing Limitations: A Policy Against Military Involvement
in Civilian Affairs
Since 1776, the United States government has erected
barriers against military involvement in civilian affairs. Courts
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. Id.
40. Eliott C. McLaughlin, No Indictments for Georgia SWAT Team That
Burned Baby with Stun Grenade, CNN (Oct. 7, 2014, 5:50 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/07/us/georgia-toddler-stun-grenade-no-indictment/
(last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. Id.
42. See
Botched
Paramilitary
Police
Raids,
CATO
INST.,
http://www.cato.org/raidmap (last visited Jan. 2, 2015) (mapping and listing
various examples of botched paramilitary police raids) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. Clay Falls & Michael Order, Man Charged with Killing Burleson
County Deputy No Billed by Grand Jury, KBTX.COM (Feb. 7, 2014, 8:50 PM),
http://www.kbtx.com/home/headlines/Man-Charged-With-Killing-BurlesonCounty-Deputy-No-Billed-by-Grand-Jury-243993261.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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have long noted these restrictions, viewed as utterly essential to
basic liberty,44 and exemplified by such laws as the Third
Amendment to the Constitution,45 the Insurrection Act,46 and the
Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).47 The quartering of British troops in
colonial Boston in the late eighteenth century served as a partial
catalyst to the Revolutionary War.48 These troops were placed
among the dissident population of Boston as a show of power in
an attempt to coerce an increasingly volatile populace into
submission.49 The Founders took issue with military law
enforcement for several reasons, but none was more infuriating to
those under martial law than their inability to dispense justice
44. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1972) (“[A] traditional and
strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusions into civilian
affairs . . . found early expression, for example, in the Third Amendment’s
explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers in private homes without
consent and in the constitutional provisions for civilian control of the military.”);
United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a NCIS
sweep of civilian computers throughout Washington state for child pornography
violated the Posse Comitatus Act and that the evidence should be excluded
because of “‘a traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military
intrusion into civilian affairs’” (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 15)). The PCA was
originally enacted on the understandings that “[t]he great beauty of our system
of government is that it is to be governed by the people,” and that if we use the
“military power . . . to discharge those duties that belong to civil officers and to
the citizens,” we “have given up the character of [our] Government; it is no
longer a government for liberty; it is no longer a government founded in the
consent of the people; it has become a government of force.” 7 CONG. REC. 4247
(1878) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Hill). See generally CHARLES DOYLE &
JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND
RELATED MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW (2012),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.”). See generally Tom W. Bell, The Third
Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117 (1993)
(detailing the origins and use of the Third Amendment).
46. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2012).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012).
48. See DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 44, at n.12 (“The soldiers, one ought
always to remember, went into Boston not as an occupying army but rather as a
force of uniformed peace-keepers, or policemen. Their role as even the radicals
conceived it was to assist the executive and if necessary the courts to maintain
order.” (internal citation omitted)).
49. See id.
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when a soldier committed a crime.50 The militarized police forces
in the United States today mirror the British military that
occupied Boston most vividly in this light.
It is difficult to hold an officer personally liable for a crime or
civil rights violation committed while exercising official police
business. In the civil context, qualified immunity has become an
almost insurmountable tool to prevent the personal liability of
law enforcement officers.51 As for criminal liability, a local law
enforcement officer is nearly insusceptible to grand jury
indictment.52
A cursory legal analysis of the aforementioned Insurrection
Act, PCA, and Third Amendment53 demonstrates that there is
nothing strictly illegal about a militarized local police force.54 For
50. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2 (U.S. 1776) (“He [King
George] has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the
Civil power . . . . [He has assented to] protecting them [the soldiers], by a mock
Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the
Inhabitants of these States.”).
51. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity
balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.”); Philip M. Stinson, Steven L. Brewer Jr., Theresa M. Lanese &
Mallorie A. Wilson, Federal Civil Rights Litigation Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983
as a Correlate of Police Misconduct, AM. SOC’Y OF CRIMINOLOGY (Nov. 2014),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=philip_stins
on (discussing a study of how civil litigation against police officers relates to
officer misconduct).
52. See Philip M. Stinson, Evin J. Carmack, Jacob M. Frankhouser &
Mallorie A. Wilson, Police Crime Arrests in the United States, 2011, AM. SOC’Y OF
CRIMINOLOGY (Nov. 2014), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1039&context=philip_stinson (noting that during a seven-year period, ending in
2011, forty-one police officers were charged with either murder or manslaughter
out of 2,600 justifiable homicides that were reported to the F.B.I. in the same
period) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); James C. McKinley
Jr. & Al Baker, Grand Jury System, With Exceptions, Favors the Police in
Fatalities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/nyregi
on/grand-juries-seldom-charge-police-officers-in-fatal-actions.html?_r=0
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2015) (noting how “the justice system can favor the police, often
shielding them from murder or serious manslaughter charges”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
54. See generally DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 44 (discussing the legal
underpinnings and application of the PCA); Canestaro, supra note 2, at 100
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example, for the purposes of Posse Comitatus, the militarized
local police forces are not “part of the Army or Air Force” under
the direct command of the Department of Defense.55 Further, the
PCA was substantially weakened in 1981 to allow the military to
more completely participate in the war on drugs.56
Be this as it may, the strict legality of an action taken in
reliance on the status quo does not lend credence to the
proposition that it is the moral, ethical, or prudent path for our
society, as we have so painfully learned in the past.57 Therefore,
now is the time for action; be it legislation, litigation, or a shift in
policy, an effective solution to this threat to liberty must be
found. A glimmer of hope in the litigation context has recently
surfaced in a judicial strengthening of the long-neglected PCA. In
United States v. Dreyer,58 the Ninth Circuit held that—beyond
the criminal sanctions included in the statute, which have never
been successfully invoked—a PCA violation can lead to the
exclusion of evidence.59

(noting that “increased public confidence in the military and judicial deference
to military actions have undermined the principles upon which the PCA was
founded” and there is a resulting increase in the DOD’s legal freedom to
intervene domestically).
55. See, e.g., DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 44, at 54 (discussing the legal test
to determine whether military activity in support of civilian authorities violated
the PCA); Canestaro, supra note 2, at 123 (discussing the phrase “any part of
the Army” within the PCA).
56. See DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 44, at 41–46 (noting the expansions
made to the PCA during the 1981 amendments); Canestaro, supra note 2, at
114–16 (discussing the 1981 amendments to the PCA).
57. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, (outlining the three-fifths compromise);
id. art. I, § 9, (discussing the “importation of such persons”); id. art. IV § 2 (“No
person held to Service or Labor in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labor . . . .”); Indian Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411,
§ 1 (1830) (providing for an exchange of land with the Indians and their
removal); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (concluding that the doctrine
of “separate but equal” was constitutional), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that segregation of children in public
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
58. 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014).
59. See id. at 835–36 (noting that there is a need to exercise the
exclusionary rule because “there is evidence of widespread and repeated
violations” (internal citations omitted)).
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IV. The Federal Response to Militarization: Too Little Too Late
Shortly after the public display of power in Ferguson, the
U.S. Senate began reacting to public outcry over the efficacy of
militarized police forces. As part of this bipartisan reaction,
Senators “criticized federal programs that outfit police
departments with military gear, saying they waste funds and sow
mistrust between law enforcement and the communities they
police.”60 While initially promising, as of the time of this writing,
any congressional action on this issue seems unlikely.
In 2014, President Barack Obama ordered a review of the
acquisition programs that funnel military-grade equipment to
local law enforcement agencies.61 The Executive Office of the
President released its conclusions in a memorandum that
detailed the sources of the questionable equipment being used on
American streets and posited suggestions for curtailing law
enforcement militarization in December 2014.62 In January 2015,
President Obama signed an executive order creating “law
enforcement working group” co-chaired by the Secretaries of
Defense and Homeland Security and the Attorney General.63 The
executive order requires the working group to: (1) “identify
agency actions that can improve Federal support for the
acquisition of controlled equipment” by local law enforcement
60. Andrew Grossman, Senators Criticized Growing Militarization of Local
Police Departments, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2014, 7:38 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/senators-criticize-militarization-of-local-policedepartments-1410287125 (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. Mark Landler, Obama Offers New Standards on Police Gear in Wake of
Ferguson
Protests,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
1,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/us/politics/obama-to-toughen-standards-onpolice-use-of-military-gear.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Alicia Parlapiano, The Flow of Money and
Equipment
to
Local
Police,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
1,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/23/us/flow-of-money-andequipment-to-local-police.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, REVIEW: FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
EQUIPMENT
ACQUISITION
(Dec.
2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/federal_support_for_local_law
_enforcement_equipment_acquisition.pdf.
63. Exec. Order No. 13,688, 80 Fed. Reg. 3451, 3451–3453 (Jan. 22, 2015).
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agencies (LEAs); and (2) “provide [a report containing] specific
recommendations [and an implementation plan] to the President
regarding actions that can be taken to improve the provision of
Federal support for the acquisition of controlled equipment by
LEAs.”64
It is doubtful that the working group created by President
Obama will recommend complete demilitarization of the police or
shift the culture of militarization. In fact, these proposals may
exacerbate the situation. For example, the committee suggests
that it is “possible that an increase in technology sharing, crosstraining and increased operational relationships between LEAs
and the military can foster an environment at the local level in
which it is difficult to distinguish between the appropriate
military use and the appropriate LEA use of the same
equipment.”65 It seems that the executive response to the
perceived over-militarization of American police will include
actual military training and closer relations between law
enforcement and military organizations, which will likely
intensify the military mindset adopted by police forces.
Additionally, the President’s memorandum contains a
suggestion that law enforcement agencies should “have policies in
place that address appropriate use and employment of controlled
equipment, as well as protection of civil rights and civil
liberties.”66 While facially a bold and admirable endeavor, this too
falls short of what is needed. As evidenced by the July 2014 death
of Eric Garner at the hands of the New York Police Department,
the existence of a department policy does little to assure law
enforcement accountability. After all, the officer responsible for
Mr. Garner’s death violated a longstanding policy of his
department and was not indicted.67 Another suggestion contained
64.

Id.

65. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 62, at 4.
66. Id. at 6.
67. See Ray Sanchez & Shimon Prokupecz, Protests After N.Y. Cop Not
Indicted in Chokehold Death; Feds Reviewing Case, CNN (Dec. 4, 2014, 6:09
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/03/justice/new-york-grand-jury-chokehold/
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (describing Garner’s death, the police officer’s
violation of department policy, and the lack of indictment for that violation and
Garner’s death) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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in the memorandum would “[r]equire after-action analysis
reports for significant incidents involving federally-provided or
federally-funded equipment.”68 While this recommendation
appears to have value, one can only speculate as to what
constitutes “significant incidents.” As explained in detail above,
SWAT deployment has become a daily occurrence in the United
States, with St. Louis County, Missouri, maintaining a policy
that all felony warrants must be served by a SWAT team.69 Thus,
it is very unlikely that such routine practice would qualify as
“significant.” Further, the aforementioned self-funding nature of
these tactical teams would suggest that many of them are no
longer in need of federal funding or equipment, and will therefore
be able to functionally ignore any suggestions made by the
President’s working group.70
This ability to evade federal oversight is the reason that
localities must ensure that law enforcement agencies remain
accountable to the communities they serve. In this sense, the
White House review succeeds. The memo suggests that the
President “[r]equire local civilian (non-police) review of and
authorization for LEAs to request or acquire controlled
equipment.”71 Some states have already responded to botched
raids and militarized tactics by enacting legislation aimed at
gathering statistics on the issue.72 Such laws are promising, and
certainly have merit, but policies must be implemented to limit
SWAT raids to the originally intended scope of hostage and active
shooter situations.
V. Conclusion

68. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 62, at 6.
69. See Sells, supra note 33 (describing Missouri’s policy of SWAT team
use).

70. See Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 15, at 9 (describing the means by
which certain police forces are self funded).
71. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 62, at 6.
72. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8.5 (2014) (requiring law enforcement
agencies to report several statistics involving SWAT deployment); MD.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., supra note 24.
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The citations presented in this Essay are a demonstration of
the important first step that our country has taken in the
demilitarization of police: awareness. The sources above
represent all sides of the political, socioeconomic, and cultural
spectrum, serving as a representation of the true import of the
issue. However, it is critical that the American people take hold
of this wave of public discourse to effect true change upon the
destructive policies outlined herein. The people must strive to
reintegrate police forces into the communities that they serve.
The normalization of SWAT raids must stop, and officers’ faith in
their own communities must be restored. No longer can we allow
the overarching concept of “officer safety” to degrade justice and
democracy. Rather, the paragon of a safe police officer is one that
is protected by the community itself, not at war with it. Localities
must pass their own laws and policies that demilitarize law
enforcement agencies and allow communities to move forward
with a proactive police force that restores the lost adage of “peace
officer.”

